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EDITOR'S NOTE: The following two articles constitute a dis-
cussion of the question whether the Supreme Court of the United
States should have ruled on the merits in DeFunis v. Odegaard,
deciding the constitutionality of racially preferential admissions
programs. Professor O'Neil argues that the Court was correct in rul-
ing the case moot and deferring decision until a better case is pre-
sented to the Court for decision. Professor Baldwin urges that the
need for express constitutional sanction of preferential programs is
so great that decisions should not have been delayed.
AFTER DEFUNIS:
FILLING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VACUUM
ROBERT M. O'NEIL*
Perhaps it is just as well the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of
the DeFunis case. Even though the legal issues were fully briefed and argued
and great expectations had built up around the case in both legal and higher
education circles,' the facts of the case surely did not present an ideal vehicle
for adjudication of the extremely delicate and sensitive constitutional issues
raised by preferential admissions. Even less was this an appropriate case in
which to determine the over-all constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams. A decision on the merits would probably have been unsatisfying and
might well have created more problems than it would have solved.
Had the Court decided in Mr. DeFunis' favor, one could have distinguished
the case on several grounds. At the time the critical admissions decision was
made in 1971, the University of Washington lacked a dearly articulated policy
on preferential admissions, for no specific criteria warranting departure from
the numerical ranking of applicants had been developed.2 Moreover, no basic
record was ever made on the "compelling interests" that the Washington
*A.B. 1956, A.M. 1957, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University; Executive Vice President for
Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
1. See, e.g., Totenberg, Discriminating To End Discrimination, N.Y. Times, April 14,
1974, §6 (Magazine) at 7, which appeared on the eve of the Supreme Court decision and like
most of the contemporary newspaper and magazine commentaries assumed that a judgment
on the merits would soon be forthcoming.
2. Throughout the litigation the University relied rather heavily upon a statement made
by the University's president in 1959 and reaffirmed by him at the trial. Originally, the Uni-
versity's position had been simply one of "nondiscrimination" in regard to admissions, em-
ployment, and other matters. Gradually during the 1960's, however, the University came to
realize that mere "nondiscrimination" would not increase the representation of minority
groups in a state with a relatively small minority population. Thus, the need for more active
recruitment measures was recognized, and it became a part of the University's affirmative
action program shortly before the development of this lawsuit. See Brief for Respondents at
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supreme court found sufficient to sustain the preferential policy; resort to
judicial notice, legal writings, demographic data, and the like plugged the gap
in this case, but such proof might not have satisfied a less sympathetic state
court. Even the particular admissions process utilized by the University of
Washington could have been faulted in certain respects, as the dissenting
justices in the state supreme court and some of the amici briefs stressed.3
Clearer articulation of the preferential policy has been accompanied by a
more efficient procedure for the review of minority applications. Thus, if the
same case arose today, the substantive issues would no longer be obscured by
arguably deficient procedures.
Had DeFunis prevailed on the merits, there would have been one other
possible basis for distinction: the Washington Law School's minority goals,
which some have quite unfairly called "ethnic quotas," 4 actually exceeded the
minority population of the state. Indeed, rough proportionality for black
students already existed in the law school before the preferential policy was
adopted. 5 To the extent that race-conscious admissions decisions can be justi-
fied by minority underrepresentation and a resulting quest for proportionality,
Washington's remedy arguably might have surpassed its needs.
On the other hand, had the Supreme Court sustained the University's posi-
tion on the merits, the scope of the judgment might also have been limited.
There was always the lingering issue of standing, stemming from the fact that
DeFunis would probably riot have been admitted even in the complete ab-
sence of a minority preference.6 In a later case challenging the preferential
admission policy of the University of California (Davis) Medical School, the
trial court did in fact invoke just such a bar.7 Despite a finding that the ad-
39-40 & n.26, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The University of Washington Law
Faculty adopted a new and much more detailed statement of admissions policies on December
4, 1973. It now effects a useful model for other institutions practicing preferential admis-
sions. These policies are set forth in an Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas, DeFunis v. Odegaard, supra at 345. Especially pertinent is §6: "Because certain
ethnic groups in our society have historically been limited in their access to the legal pro-
fession and because the resulting underrepresentation can affect the quality of legal services
available to members of such groups, as well as limit their opportunity for full participa-
tion in the governance of our communities, the faculty recognizes a special obligation in its
admissions policy to contribute to the solution of the problem."
3. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 45, 507 P.2d 1169, 1189 (1973) (Hale, C.J.,
dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Drucker, Reverse Discrimination? The Supreme Court on Quota Systems,
COLLEGE, April 1974, at 17.
5. See Brief for Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Jurisdictional Statement at 14, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Relatively little
was made of this issue during the course of the argument, however. There is no evidence of
proportionality at any time for other preferred minority groups.
6. According to the response to interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff in superior
court, on the basis of all predictive factors reviewed by the Admissions Committee, DeFunis
had been placed in the lowest quartile of the waiting list. It was thus extremely unlikely
that he would ever have been admitted, with or without a special minority admission pro-
gram. See Single Appendix in the Supreme Court of the United States, at 27, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
7. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Davis, No. 31,287 (Yolo County Super. Ct., Nov.
28, 1974).
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missions program was unconstitutional because it denied equality to whites,
relief was withheld from the particular plaintiff who ranked too far down the
waiting list to be considered in any event. Such a disposition, though not
inevitable, would have been appropriate in DeFunis, for there would have
been something unseemly about deciding the constitutionality of preferential
admissions at the request of a person who would not have been helped by its
absence. Ironically, in fact, it was only the existence of the minority admissions
program, as the catalyst for the lawsuit, that gave DeFunis even the slightest
chance of getting into the law school of his choice.8
Another distinguishing feature of the DeFunis case is the extent and scope
of the law school's departure from strict numerical ranking of applicants. For
example, a substantial number of returning veterans received a sort of "pref-
erence" over persons with higher test scores and grades. In addition, admissions
decisions within preferred groups reflected emphasis upon nonquantitative
predictors of law school performance and professional potential.9 Many
minority applicants were rejected, and those accepted were taken not in strict
rank order, but on the basis of intangible as well as numerical indicia of
promise. Finally, the Washington admissions policy involved no quota or
fixed enrollment; rather, broad minority admission ranges were set, with the
number of students actually enrolled dependent upon the availability of
qualified minority applicants and the rate at which they accepted. Thus, a
decision in favor of this particular form of preferential admissions would have
fallen far short of what many journalists and other lay observers believed to be
the central issue in the case - the constitutionality of ethnic quotas or absolute
racial preferences.
Finally, the very strength of the state court's decision would have lessened
the impact of a Supreme Court affirmance. Since the Washington court took
as the appropriate constitutional test the presence or absence of a "compelling
state interest,"10 the decisive recognition of such an interest by a state court
passing upon the state university's admissions policies would surely have been
entitled to some deference. Had the Washington court reached the opposite
result, or had the case come up through the federal courts, or had a different
constitutional test been applied, a cleaner slate might have been presented to
a Supreme Court desirous of reaching the merits.
In short, the DeFunis case became a cause cdlbbre for reasons only remotely
related to its facts. A major constitutional decision would surely have been
tossible, but the avoidance of that decision may prove at least a partial
blessing. We now have an opportunity to address the issues once again in a
case that will provide a more suitable vehicle for constitutional adjudication.
The focus of this article will be on that "next case," of which there are several
8. It is true that DeFunis, once admitted under court order, not only survived the first
year but graduated in good standing. That fact, however, does not undermine the original
decision to reject his application. The satisfactory academic performance of an applicant well
down on the waiting list proves, instead, that many who are rejected, as well as those who are
accepted, by law schools in these highly competitive days are "qualified" to do the work.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 32, 507 P.2d 1167, 1182 (1973).
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examples already in process.1' As this analysis proceeds, it might be well to
keep in mind the most difficult of all cases - the hypothetical suggested by Mr.
Justice Douglas in his DeFunis dissent. Suppose the rejection by the University
of Washington of an Asian student from a low-income background, whose
education has been impaired by language barriers12 and by overcrowded,
under-supported schools, but who is not included among the preferred "mi-
norities." If such an applicant were close enough to the admission borderline
that (unlike DeFunis) he would almost certainly have been admitted but for
the preferential program, his case would raise much more starkly both the
constitutional and public policy issues of preferential admissions. Yet if the
decision to reject DeFunis was defensible, that same rationale should sustain
the rejection of the disadvantaged Asian.
The necessary starting point is to identify the proper constitutional stand-
ard. Once that determination has been made, the implications of that stand-
ard must be reviewed with an eye to the kind of record that might be built. As
suggested earlier, such a record was not required by the Washington supreme
court because that court believed the requisite support for the University's
policies to be virtually self-evident. Other courts are likely to be more de-
manding.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Clearly, the constitutionality of preferential admissions policies arises under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Such identification
of the basic constitutional constraint does not answer, but only poses the
threshold question of the standard of equality against which a preferential ad-
missions policy is to be judged. Because different classifications are judged by
markedly different standards of equality, three possible formulations might
be applied to a governmental practice such as the preferential admission of
minority students: (1) the use of race as a basis of classification is per se in-
valid regardless of the purpose or effect of the classification; (2) like other
classifications, racial preferences would be valid if a "rational basis" for them
could be found; and (3) the use of race would be permissible only if it served
a "compelling state interest" and survived "rigid scrutiny" - either because
the use of race is "inherently suspect" or because the classification affects some
"fundamental interest." Each of these three options must be examined in turn,
since all three are superficially applicable to the preferential admission prob-
lem.
11. E.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Davis, No. 31,287 (Yolo County Super. Ct.,
Nov. 28, 1974).
12. See 416 U.S. at 332, 338-40 (Douglas J., dissenting). The equities of such a case may
well be enhanced by the Supreme Court's decision, earlier in the same term, in Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). The Court there held that the San Francisco public school sys-
tem had violated title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide supplemental
English instruction to those students who did not speak English. The decision strongly im-
plied that where language barriers impede equal access to educational programs and benefits,
the district incurs an affirmative duty to surmount those barriers through supplemental in-
struction.
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A "Per Se" Test
The Supreme Court has always stopped short of holding that any use of
race for any purpose is per se violative of the equal protection clause. Even
where a particular use of race harms the very groups for whose protection the
fourteenth amendment was designed, a per se holding has been avoided.' 3
Where the use of race is designed to benefit such groups, or remove barriers
that separate racial groups, the Court has seemingly sanctioned recognition of
race. In the North Carolina school desegregation cases, for example, the Court
declared that "[j]ust as the race of students must be considered in determining
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be con-
sidered in formulating a remedy."'14
The inappropriateness of a per se test would be clear were it not for sev-
eral passages in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in DeFunis. While
recognizing the validity of ameliorative steps to offset possible bias in admis-
sion criteria, Douglas seemed to question the validity of race or ethnic group
as the basis of dispensation. At one point he cautioned: "The Equal Protec-
tion Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in
order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized."'15 Even
more explicitly, he observed: "So far as race is concerned, any state-sponsored
preference to one race over another.., is in my view 'invidious' and violative
of the Equal Protection Clause."' 6 Moreover, Justice Douglas warns of the
hazards of permitting even those racial distinctions and preferences that meet
a "compelling interest" test because "[t]o many, 'compelling' would give mem-
bers of one race even more than pro rata representation."'17 Throughout the
Douglas opinion runs a deep ambivalence between a desire to sanction the
end sought by preferential admissions and an apprehension of sanctioning the
use of race or ethnic status as the selective criterion. One might, therefore,
read Justice Douglas to say that explicitly racial classifications are per se un-
constitutional, though their goals and aims may be achieved through nonracial
means.
There are, however, several reasons for doubting that a majority of the
Court would foreclose explicitly race-conscious remedies. Although the Court
has not sustained a racial classification since the Japanese relocation cases,18 it
has also scrupulously avoided sweeping pronouncements in cases striking down
13. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), where the Court struck down a
state miscegenation law imposing stricter criminal penalties on interracial relationships. The
invitation to declare such a law invalid, per se, because of its obvious racial bias, must have
been strong but was avoided.
14. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971). See generally for
discussion of these cases and related issues, O'Neil, Preferential Admissions. Equalizing the
Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 707-09 (1971).
15. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 343-44.
17. Id. at 341.
18. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). In Hirabayashi the Court did indicate the danger of such classifications on
explicitly ethnic lines: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their race are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
1975
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discriminatory measures.19 There would have been no reason to approach the
issue so gingerly unless the Court anticipated the kind of issue that DeFunis
presented; surely the present Court is not keeping the issue open in order
someday to reapprove wartime internment camps. One could argue the Court
has reserved this issue to allow certain neutral uses of race for purely sta-
tistical reasons - like the racial listing on Virginia divorce decrees upheld in
Tancil v. Woolls.20 But it seems unlikely that so major and obvious an excep-
tion would be perpetuated for so modest a goal, particularly during a period
of frontal assault on racial segregation and discrimination. Hence the clear and
conscious avoidance of a per se test probably anticipated the preferential
situation - whatever implication to the contrary one finds in Justice Douglas'
dissent.
There is another and equally persuasive reason for the Court's reluctance
to impose a per se standard. Within the past three or four years the lower
federal and state courts have increasingly relied upon race as a remedial canon.
Race-conscious decrees have been most prominently used in public school
desegregation cases 21 and public employment litigation,22 but have also played
a role in urban renewal, 23 broadcast license,2 4 and other matters. The school
desegregation cases have left no doubt about the propriety of fashioning rem-
edies on the basis of race - not only in the South, where the legacy of de jure
segregation provides special extenuation, but also in the North and West
where racial imbalances have less malignant origins.25 Courts have been in-
creasingly bold about ordering desegregation plans, which obviously must take
race into account. Although the Supreme Court has not expressly validated
such remedies where evidence of de jure segregation is lacking,26 the direction
and tone of its decisions leave little doubt about their propriety.27
It is in the public employment area that the use of race-conscious remedies
has been most marked. Scarcely three years ago a federal court of appeals up-
equality." 320 U.S. at 100. See generally Rostow, The Japanese American Cases- A Disaster,
54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
19. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
20. 379 U.S. 19 (1964). This is at best marginal precedent; the Supreme Court in a brief
per curiam order affirmed a complex district court judgment that had invalidated some racial
delineations in local records, and sustained at least one racial distinction. The case was
argued and briefed on the merits, but drew relatively little attention from the Court and
the legal community.
21. E.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swarm, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
22. E.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473
F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1971); Erie Human Relations Comm'n v.
Tullio, 357 F. Supp. 422, motion to modify denied, 360 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Pa. 1973), mod-
ified, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974).
23. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 935-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25. E.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 921 (1973), appears to undermine the im-
portance of the de jure-de facto distinction, but does not reach the question of remedies
appropriate to a purely de facto situation. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
27. E.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
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held the controversial Philadelphia Plan requiring private contractors doing
government work to adopt goals for minority employment. 28 Since that time
matters have proceeded apace, and a number of other affirmative action re-
quirements in both the public and private sectors have been sustained against
both constitutional and statutory challenges.- Even more remarkable are the
recent decisions compelling quota hiring of qualified minority applicants on a
numerical ratio basis, in order to ensure significant nonwhite representation in
the labor force.30 While the United States Supreme Court has never sustained
such an order, it has denied certiorari in enough cases3' to suggest that Mr.
Justice Douglas' concern about the use of explicit racial preference is not
universally shared.
- The public employment and school desegregation decisions actually go
beyond preferential admission in three respects. First, these courts have re-
quired public agencies to prefer minority group members, rather than simply
permitting the implementation of a voluntary remedial plan. Second, the em-
ployment cases have often imposed strict numerical quotas, -as distinguished
from goals or ranges, although in no case has a court ordered or even con-
doned the filling of such a quota with persons- unqualified for the position.
Third, the public employment cases- both those that permit and those that
require race conscious remedies - usually cite race as the sole canon of pref-
erence, rather than simply as one factor in a complex process. The preferential
admission process, on the other hand, may begin by setting aside certain ap-
plications for special consideration solely on the basis of race, but review and
appraisal of individual files involve many other factors not required by courts
or agencies in the public employment setting32
28. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
584 (1971).
29. Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973);
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972). The Altshuler case
is especially apposite in this context. In the course of sustaining a Massachusetts affirmative
action requirement imposed on contractors doing business with and for the Commonwealth,
the court expressed this view of race-conscious remedies: "It is by now well understood...
that our society cannot be completely colorblind in the short term if we are to have a
colorblind society in the long term. After centuries of viewing through colored lenses, eyes
do not quickly adjust when the lenses are removed. Discrimination has a way of perpetuating
itself, albeit unintentionally, because the resulting inequalities make new opportunities less
accessible. Preferential treatment is one partial prescription to remedy our society's most
intransigent and deeply rooted inequalities." 490 F.2d at 16.
30. E.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Pennsyl ania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d
1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (Ist Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1971). See generally Hill, Preferential Hiring:
Correcting the Demerit System, SOCIAL PoLICY, July-Aug. 1973, at 96-102.
31. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
32. See the description of the University of Washington's Law School admissions process
-even before the recent reforms- in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 14-23, 507 P.2d
1169, 1172-77 (1973). See also the extensive discussion of the complexity and multi-faceted
nature of the admissions process in the Brief for the President g- Fellows of Harvard College
as Amicus Curiae at 12-19, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See generally
B. THREsHER, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1966) (comments of a veteran
admissions officer). .% ...
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It has been suggested that the public employment and school desegregation
cases do not apply in the preferential admissions context.3 3 Two distinctions
have been offered: first, that such decisions emerge from a background of de
jure discrimination that permits compensatory use of race; and second, that
use of race in the employment and school settings does not disadvantage
nonminority groups. Both these distinctions require study.
A background of de jure discrimination, or a court finding of discrimina-
tion, does not seem essential to a remedial use of race. While the earlier cases
did typically involve prior racial discrimination, more recent decisions in the
areas of public employment and public education definitely do not.34 Cities
like Boston, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia have hired relatively few minority
firemen and policemen, but not because of any explicit policy against employ-
ment of blacks or Chicanos. While courts have found evidence of de facto
racial exclusion, or bias in the effects of standardized tests, the resulting under-
representation is quite different from the consciously segregationist policies of
southern governmental agencies.35 Moreover, the suggestion that racial classi-
fication can be used only to overcome the effects of past discrimination would
produce bizarre results. The very case of law school admissions highlights the
anomaly. Were this test adopted it would mean that those law schools that had
once practiced discrimination in their admissions policies could now prefer-
entially admit minority students while other law schools could not. Thus, the
law schools of the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Mis-
souri at Columbia - both the targets of successful desegregation suits in the
late 1940's 31 -would today have a broader choice of remedies because of their
past policies than would the newer state law schools at Lubbock and Kansas
City. The underrepresentation of minority students and minority lawyers and
the need for black and Chicano practitioners, would thus be relevant to the
admissions policies of one group of state schools but not to others, solely be-
cause of an accident of history. Texas Tech and Kansas City could not give
ameliorative consideration to race because they had never in the past used
race as a barrier.
The other proffered distinction seems equally tenuous. It is argued that
race-based remedies are valid in public employment and school segregation be-
cause they help the minority without hurting the majority. Yet the mere fact
that white parents have often gone to court to challenge busing programs,37
and that white applicants have sued to enjoin preferential hiring,38 argues
strongly to the contrary. As the DeFunis brief of Harvard University explains:
33. See Brief for Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Jurisdictional Statement at 12-15, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
34. See cases cited notes 21-22 supra.
35. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (Alabama Highway Patrol);
Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1973) (Mississippi Highway Patrol).
36. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). See Jones, The Sweatt Case and the Develop-
ment of Legal Education for Negroes in Texas, 47 TEXAs L. REv. 677 (1969).
37. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (Ist Cir. 1973);
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1974).
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"The disappointments and adverse consequences of assignment to be bused out
of one's own neighborhood may be just as serious as those of denial of ad-
mission to a particular law school, for both parents and child."39 In fact, the
plight of the bused white pupil or the rejected applicant for public employ-
ment may be even greater because the preferentially-rejected law student is
likely to be more mobile. Marco DeFunis, for example, was accepted by the
University of Oregon Law School and presumably could have attended at
resident tuition rates because of a reciprocity agreement between the two
neighboring states. In view of the low probability that DeFunis would have
been admitted to the University of Washington even if no preferential pro-
gram had existed, it is ironic to argue that courts should look more harshly
upon racial classification in his case than in cases involving white firemen in
Minneapolis or white policemen in Philadelphia. As the Harvard brief con-
cludes: "The question is not one of relative hardship. If attention to race or
color were barred under the Equal Protection Clause by any hard-and-fast
rule, it would be as unconstitutional in the one case as the other."'40
The public school and employment cases thus argue persuasively against
a per se constitutional standard. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court
would rule out the use of race for all purposes when the lower courts have
become so race-conscious, apparently with the high Court's blessing. Were a
per se test now adopted, hundreds of lower court decisions would have to be
undone, and the progress of affirmative action would be seriously retarded.
Actually, a per se standard would have a far less drastic effect upon higher
education than on other sectors, because there is far less exclusive reliance
upon race in the admissions process than in other selective procedures. Never-
theless, it would be premature to speculate about the possible implications of
a per se equal protection standard until the full Court gives some signal it has
chosen that direction.
A "Rational Basis" Test
At the other extreme, it could be argued that benign or ameliorative use
of race should be sustained if there is any "rational basis" for its use. The
premise of this claim is almost simplistic. The Court has imposed a more
rigorous standard in only two contexts: where the classification impairs a
"fundamental interest" such as the right to vote or to travel and where the
basis of the classification is "invidious." According to this argument, access to
education and employment apparently are not fundamental interests that de-
serve special constitutional protection. 41 The question then remains whether
use of race or ethnic status is "invidious" even where the objective is to help
groups that have historically been the victims of discrimination. The argu-
ment for a "rational basis" test relies heavily upon the consonance of purpose
between preferential policies and the equal protection clause, adopted soon
39. Brief for the President & Fellows of Harvard College as Amicus Curiae at 20.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education). For
the suggestion that access to public employment enjoys no special constitutional protection,
see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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after emancipation of the former slaves, and quickly implemented by ex-
pressly race-conscious acts of Congress.42 Hence, the argument runs, where it is
clear that a governmental policy seeks to enhance or implement the equal pro-
tection guarantees, it would be incongruous to regard such a classification as
"suspect."43
This claim may have received some unexpected support from a post-
DeFunis Supreme Court decision. Morton v. Mancari44 presented for the first
time the validity of a statutory preference for Indians in the employ of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.45 The Court first held that title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which forbids discrimination in federally funded programs, 46 had
not superseded the Indian preference law. A variety of special congressional
and federal concerns with the Indian tribes justified this conclusion and also
helped the Court reach a similar result on the constitutional claim. Opponents
had argued that an explicit racial preference for Indians ran afoul of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, citing the District of Columbia school
segregation case. 47 A unanimous opinion for the Court by Mr. Justice Black-
mun rejected this claim, citing inter alia "the unique legal status of Indian
tribes under federal law and ... the plenary power of Congress ... to legislate
on behalf of federally recongized Indian tribes. " 4 8 Several explicit constitu-
tional references, and much contemporaneous legislation, supported this view.
The Court also suggested that a preference for Indians was not really racial,
but was based instead on tribal membership and federal solicitude for tribal
members: "The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose
lives and activities are governed by the BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] in a
unique fashion."4 9 Given this background and context, the Court found the
Indian preference valid because it was "reasonably and directly related to a
legitimate, nonracially based goal." 50
Resort to a "rational basis" test in Mancari could conceivably support a
similar standard in preferential admissions. Evidence of comparable concern
for blacks is not hard to find. For example, the Supreme Court recently held
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 carried out the thirteenth amendment by
guaranteeing that "all citizens shall have the same right ... enjoyed by white
citizens" to purchase housing.5 1 The Congress that proposed the fourteenth
amendment also enacted legislation to strengthen the Freedmens' Bureau and
confirmed land grants expressly for "heads of families of the African race."5 2
Thus, the historical basis for a looser standard of review of preferential action
42. E.g., Act of July 16, 1866, 14 Stat. 174.
43. See Brief for Respondents at 22-26, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
44. 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974).
45. The preference was created by 25 U.S.C. §472 (1970).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a) (1970).
47. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
48. Morton v. Mancari, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2483 (1974).
49. Id. at 2484.
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1972). See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
52. Act of July 16, 1866, §6, 12 Stat. 175.
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benefiting blacks bears some resemblance to the history invoked in Mancari.
Yet the analogy seems ultimately unsound. For one thing, this argument
proves too little; it would establish one standard for review of classifications
that favored blacks and Indians, and another for the Chicanos, Puerto Ricans,
and other minority groups. Preferential admission policies seldom differentiate
among minority groups in this way; the historic differences between the older
and newer minority groups in the United States bear no relationship whatever
to their current needs, aspirations, and potential. It would be truly ironic if
the recentness of the arrival of Asian and Spanish-speaking groups were both a
major source of their special needs and the reason why compensatory benefits
available to blacks and Indians were not also available to them.
Quite recently a different defense of the "rational basis" test has emerged.
In one of the earliest post-DeFunis commentaries, Professor John Ely has
argued that "benign" racial classifications should be permitted where it is
dear that the majority has inflicted the consequences of such classifications
upon itself.53 Specifically, Ely suggests "that 'special scrutiny' is not appropriate
when-White people have decided to favor' Black.people at the expense of
White people.... [I]t is not 'suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority,
any majority, to discriminate against-itself."54 While such a standard would
avoid some of the problems posed by a more rigorous:analysis, it would intro-
duce other. complications. For example, it is hard to describe a policy de-
veloped by the law faculty of the University of Washington Law School as
being "imposed by the majority upon themselves." Indeed, it is most unlikely
that a vote of the people of the State of Washington, overwhelmingly White-
Anglo, would have supported preferential admissions at the University's gradu-
ate and professional schools. As a practical matter, if Ely's "benign" standard
really operates only when a racial classification can be characterized as truly
"self-imposed," it is hard to imagine a benefit of any importance to which it
would apply. Moreover, the determination of "majority" and "minority" for
this purpose may be more difficult than the standard suggests. There are -many
urban communities in which whites still constitute a majority of the total
population-but are outnumbered by minorities in the public schools. In such
a city, would a school busing program or an affirmative action plan for hiring
teachers be imposed for the benefit of the majority or the minority? What of
classifications that relate to county-wide or metropolitan government in areas
where blacks are the majority in the city but not in the county as a whole? It
would appear that these and similar questions could be resolved only by resort
to motive or purpose -a process against which no constitutional scholar has
warned more forcefully than Professor Ely himself.55 The "benign classifica-
tion" test therefore has some appeal, but in its present form does not offer a
path out of the maze.
The "rational basis" test and its variations should be rejected on broader,
53. Ely, The Constitutionality. of Reverse Racial.Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. Rrv;725
(1974).
54. Id. at 727.
55. See Ely, Jegislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 77 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1207-12 (1970).
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philosophical grounds as well. Racial classifications are inherently divisive and
should be used most sparingly if at all.5r Racial differences are immutable and
indelible, and should be recognized and reinforced by government only to the
degree that is absolutely necessary to serve some vital public purpose. Ethnic
classifications should not only be limited in coverage, they should also con-
tinue no longer than is absolutely necessary. Preferential admissions, for ex-
ample, must be regarded as a temporary and transitional device to be abol-
ished when the need no longer exists.
Validation of racial classifications under a rational basis test would impose
no time limit on their use. Even more important, governmental power to
classify on the basis of race or ethnic groups is dangerous, no matter how
benign the goals. Today's minority may become tomorrow's majority, and the
group that one day needs protection could later become the oppressor. Be-
cause racial information gathered for ameliorative purposes could be used
detrimentally, it is better simply not to have the information in the first place
if it can possibly be withheld.5 7
Finally, resort to the rational basis standard would imply a clear and
sharp distinction on the basis of legislative motive between "invidious" and
"benign" classifications. Such probing of legislative motive is perilous, as the
Supreme Court has warned.58 For all these reasons it seems wiser to judge the
validity of all racial classifications - those that help minority groups as well
as those that hurt - by the same basic constitutional standard.
A "Compelling Interest" Standard
One need not look far for an appropriate uniform standard. In several
relevant cases the Supreme Court has spoken of a "compelling state interest,"
which must be found in areas to sustain a "suspect" classification. The origins
of that standard are somewhat obscure, however, leaving considerable doubt
about its definition and meaning. In the DeFunis case itself, the Washington
supreme court rejected the alternative constitutional tests and concluded with-
out elaboration: "The burden is on the law school to show that its considera-
tion of race in admitting students is necessary to the accomplishment of a com-
pelling state interest." 9 The origins of this phrase are apparently traceable to
the Japanese relocation cases -in which the waging of war against a foreign
enemy was held a sufficient "interest" to justify explicitly racially discrimina-
tory measures. 6 More recently, the Court has used slightly different language:
"At the very least," said the majority in the miscegenation cases, "the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny' and if they are ever
56. See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro -
The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 375-78 (1966); cf. Graglia, Special
Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REY. 351 (1970).
57. See O'Neil, supra note 14, at 710-11.
58. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); McCray v. United States,
195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904); Ely, supra note 55.
59. 82 Wash. 2d at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182.
60. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
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to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate."61 Here
the requisite state interest is merely "permissible," not necessarily "com-
pelling," although presumably the meaning is substantially the same. Surpris-
ingly, the North Carolina school cases shed no additional light on the scope of
this phrase, although they contain the Supreme Court's only recent sanction of
explicitly race-conscious remedies.62 Against the background of earlier South-
ern school cases, there is a strong suggestion that meaningful relief from
segregation can come about only through consideration of the race of students;
perhaps the presence of a compelling governmental interest is so obvious that
any elaboration of the standard of review would appear gratuitous. Thus, the
Supreme Court decisions, which might have illumined the "compelling in-
terest" standard, lie at opposite poles - in the school desegregation cases the
compelling nature of the governmental interest was obvious, while no sub-
stantial interest could be found to support the miscegenation laws. Because of
the easy disposition of both types of constitutional claims, the Court was
simply not called upon to articulate criteria covering subtler, intermediate
problems.
Preferential admission lies somewhere between these two extremes. To ap-
ply the "compelling interest" test in this more difficult context, a clear under-
standing of the meaning of that test is needed. All that exist to date are ex-
amples - cases holding, for example, that where use of race is necessary to ac-
complish an objective compelled by the Constitution or by federal and state
laws, then such a compelling interest is present.63 What is lacking in such
holdings is any indication of the process or the criteria by which the Court
reached that conclusion. In fashioning a comprehensive test that will help
determine the validity of preferential admissions, it is necessary to look further.
At least four elements seem to comprise the "compelling state interest test":
(1) A racial classification must be consistent with the objectives of the
Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a governmental use of race that is harmful
to minority groups either in intent or in effect would be unconstitutional -
not because it is racial, but because it uses race in a way that thwarts the
goals of the fourteenth amendment. A racial classification with essentially
neutral effects would presumably pass this first test. For example, the racial
data on Virginia divorce records,64 or measures to achieve racial balance
in juries in nonracial cases, 65 would be consistent with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause even though not designed to aid minorities. Where the
purpose or effect is to enhance minority group interests or opportunities -
whether or not at the expense of the majority - the classification would a
fortiori survive this initial test.
61. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
62. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
63. See cases cited notes 61-62 supra.
64. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
65. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), wherein the Supreme Court seemingly
allowed the use of the prosecution's peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors for dis-
criminatory objectives. Arguably this decision would support nonintervention, if not positive
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(2) The governmental interest must be substantial and central to the
goals of the governmental unit employing the classification. A program de-
signed to enhance educational or employment opportunities, for example,
would appear to serve a substantial and valid end. 6G If, however, a racial
classification were used simply to increase the popularity of the govern-
mental unit, its validity would be in some doubt. This is not the place to
define a hierarchy of governmental interests, but simply to establish the
need for substantiality.
(3) The classification must be rationally related to the governmental
interest. Once a valid interest has been identified, at least a rational rela-
tionship between end and means should be established. In the Florida
miscegenation case, for example, the Court accepted the state's claim that
prevention of promiscuity and extramarital intercourse represented a valid
state interest. But the use of race for this purpose - making interracial
cohabitation an especially serious criminal offense - was impermissible be-
cause the race of the parties was irrelevant to the government's conceded
interest in sexual propriety. 7 In the school desegregation cases, by contrast,
courts have often stressed the close relationship between racial classification
of students and the elimination of racial isolation.68
(4) Finally, a racial classification should be used only where nonracial
approaches or standards would not serve the governmental interest equally
well. In other contexts -- notably constraints upon freedoms of expression
- the courts have insisted on the use of a "less onerous alternative" if one
is available to meet the same end. 69 Although no court has extended the
requirement to the racial classification, such an extension would appear
appropriate. In order to meet the "compelling state interest" test, in other
words, it must be shown that the valid governmental objective cannot be
achieved without resort to race.
The validity of preferential admissions turns essentially on the second and
fourth of these criteria. Four asserted governmental interests will now be ex-
plored, any one of which might possibly support use of ethnic preferences.
Then, because the briefs in the DeFunis case were replete with suggestions of
ways in which minority access to the legal profession could be enhanced with-
out preferential admission, the alternatives will be examined.
PROVING A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
If the framework just described is an appropriate one for constitutional
analysis, it does suggest several plausible state interests. Four specific interests
have emerged from the litigation over preferential admissions. First, the state
approval, of such de facto racial classifications in other contexts, although it has never been
so used. See also Viera, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by
Race, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 1553, 1590 (1960).
66. See text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
67. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
68. E.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Morean v. Board of Educ.,
42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250
N.Y.S.2d 281, cert.. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964). Cf. Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1970), allowing a school board to bypass the regular promotion schedule in selecting prin-
cipals, in order to increase the minority group representation at the administrative level. But
cf. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
69. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451
(1938). See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).
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may have an interest in alleviating the underrepresentation of minority groups
in law schools and in the legal profession. Second, there is an arguable state
interest in offsetting, or compensating for, the effects of traditional, quantita-
tive admissions criteria - standardized tests and undergraduate grades - which
have excluded substantial numbers of minority applicants from graduate and
professional schools. Third, the state might assert an interest in remedying the
effects or consequences of segregation, discrimination, and racial bias in other
sectors of American life by favoring those groups that had in the past been
victims of such practices. Finally, a state might justify preferential admissions
on educational grounds, as a way of making the student bodies of its uni-
versities more representative of the total community and thus enhancing the
experience of the nonminority students. Each of these four theories should be
examined separately.
Preference To Remedy Underrepresentation
There is little doubt that minority groups have been, and continue to be,
seriously underrepresented in the legal profession. The relevant data, which
have been reviewed at length elsewhere 7 0 and need only be summarized here,
show that prior to the institution of preferential admission programs scarcely
one per cent of the Bar was black, while blacks comprised eleven or twelve per
cent of the national population.71 The effects of such severe underrepresenta-
tion are only partly quantitative. There are important human dimensions as
well, which are vital to a finding of a compelling governmental interest.
It is not quite accurate to say that minorities are served by a profession
only to the extent they are represented in the profession. Clearly it is not al-
ways true that a black citizen's chance of getting to see a lawyer is only one-
tenth as great as that of a white person of the same socio-economic class.72 But
the quality of the minority community's legal representation does appear to
be strongly affected by the number of its members engaged in the practice of
law. Consider, for example, the role that the minority attorney may play in
the vital relationship between the legal system and the minority community.
Mr. Justice Brennan has observed that black lawyers "most clearly understand
the problems and difficulties found by members of the Negro community."73
The Kerner report and other studies have noted a deep distrust of the entire
legal system in the minority community74 - a distrust that may be bridged
70. See, e.g., Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DukE L.J. 1069; O'Neil,
Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Access to Legal Education, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 281;
Reynoso, La Raza, the Law, and the Law School, 1970 U. TOL. L. RPv. 809; Note, The
Negro Lawyer in Virginia: A Survey, 51 VA. L. REv. 521 (1965).
71. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION oF AMERICAN LAW SCHOoLs, Report of the Ad-
visory Committee for the Minority Groups 160 (1967).
72. Indeed, various governmentally supported programs have disproportionately aided
the minority community because of their income ceilings and the location of neighborhood
law offices and medical clinics.
73. Quoted in Brief for the Board of Governors of Rutgers - the State University of
New Jersey as Amicus Curiae at 17, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 812 (1974).
74. See Bell, Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black Disruption or Despair?, 61
CAnE. L. Rav. 165 (1973).
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only by someone who knows and is accepted and trusted by the community.
There are also some practical considerations. Where the case is a controversial
one, white or Anglo attorneys may simply be unwilling or unable to take on
the assignment even if they are generally available to the community. Such a
lawyer is far less likely than the native of the ghetto or barrio to be able to
understand the background of the case, to locate and interview witnesses, to
reconstruct events, and to gather other necessary evidence. Where the language
of parties and witnesses is Spanish, the manifest cultural and racial limitations
facing the nonnative attorney are still further compounded and the case for
minority representation is enhanced. 5 Thus, the effects of underrepresentation
cannot be measured in purely quantitative or representational terms. The
human and intangible dimensions are critical.
Most of the foregoing analysis would apply equally well to many 'serving"
professions - medicine, social work, accounting, banking, and others. However,
several factors generate special concern about minority representation in the
legal profession. One factor surely is the dominant role of lawyers at all levels
of government - in Congress, in state legislatures and city councils, and in
regulatory agencies. There is evidence that a major cause of minority frustra-
tion and even aggression against the predominantly white governmental sys-
tem is a feeling of exclusion from the decisionmaking process. 6 To the extent
that substantial increases in the minority bar would alleviate this feeling of
exclusion, it might also enhance participation and thus improve relations in
ways that access to no other profession could accomplish. Meanwhile, sub-
stantial opportunities for minority groups in the legal profession may suggest
to young blacks and Chicanos that there are ways of "making it" and of chang-
ing the system without resort to violence or self-help. The success that minority
persons realize through this channel should afford both a model and an
avenue of advancement for others.
There is also a deeply moral responsibility for the Bar. Least of all pro-
fessional groups can lawyers condone the continued exclusion of minority
groups from their own profession. A commitment to apply the Constitution
and the laws to other sectors clearly mandates an equal commitment to
equality. It would be intolerable, for example, if bar associations expelled
members or removed officers in a summary manner while calling upon other
groups to observe due process. The argument for equality of access to the
profession seems no less compelling than the case for procedural fairness. In
the North and West, at least, it is true that the Bar is no longer racially segre-
gated, and law schools there have never denied admission on racial grounds.
But the continued need for black organizations such as the National Bar As-
sociation and such local affiliates as the Cook County and Wolverine Bar As-
sociations attest to the relative recency of a truly "integrated" bar. Thus, the
extreme degree of underrepresentation of minority groups poses for the legal
profession a particularly acute dilemma.
A further effect of minority underrepresentation is to make professional
services more remote for members of the minority community. The disparities
75. See O'Neil, supra note 70, at 297-98.
76. See Bell, supra note 74.
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are quite striking. Throughout the United States there is one white lawyer for
every 631 white persons, the proportion of black citizens to black attorneys is
nearly 6,000-1. In many parts of the country the ratio is even worse. In Georgia
there is one black lawyer for every 37,500 black citizens; in North Carolina
1-16,000; in Louisiana 1-38,500; in Alabama 1-40,500; and in South Carolina
1-75,400.77 Moreover, a disproportionate number of black lawyers in the South
appear to be in state and federal government legal jobs, and are thus un-
available to serve private dients38
For other minority groups the situation is surely no better and may be
worse, though the data are sketchier. The most recent survey of the California
Bar shows that the ratio of Anglo lawyers to population is about 1-530; but for
the Spanish-speaking or Chicano community (the largest minority group in
the state), the comparable ratio is 1-9,482.79 New Jersey, which now has a
Spanish-speaking population of roughly 300,000, appears to have only three
Puerto Rican lawyers.8 0 Similar underrepresentation exists for other minority
groups; throughout the country there is only a handful of American Indian
and Eskimo lawyers to serve populations that are geographically scattered, and
disadvantaged in other ways as well.81
The State of Washington provides a microcosm of the national problem.
The black population is small in absolute numbers- about 71,000 according
to the 1970 census. But there appear to be only 15 black attorneys admitted to
practice in the state, so the ratio of lawyers to population is 1-475 - compared
to a white ratio (dose to the national average) of 1-654.82 The number of
black attorneys in Washington would have to triple before it would reach even
the national level of one per cent of the Bar.
Largely as a result of aggressive recruitment, preferential admission and
special financial aids, the numbers of minority law students have dramatically
increased since 1968. Indeed, the number of black students now enrolled in
accredited law schools actually exceeds the total number of black lawyers cur-
77. See Brief for the Board of Governors of Rutgers - the State University of New
Jersey & the Student Bar Ass'n of Rutgers School of Law at Newark as Amicus Curiae at
14-16, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
78. Id.
79. Reynoso, supra note 70, at 816.
80. Cabranes, Careers in Law for Minorities: A Puerto Rican's Perspective on Recent
Developments in Legal Education, 25 J. LEGAL ED. 447, 450-51 (1973).
81. Information about representation from these groups in the legal profession is much
more difficult to gather. As of 1968 no American Indian had ever received a law degree from
the universities of Arizona, New Mexico, or Utah despite the large Indian populations in
those states, and no American Indian was practicing in New Mexico or Arizona. University
of New Mexico Law School, Special Scholarship Program in Law for American Indians (1968)
(brochure). The situation has improved considerably since that time; during the 1973-1974
academic year there were reported to be 222 American Indian students enrolled in accredited
law schools. ASSoCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1973 SURVEY OF MINORITY GROUPS IN
LEGAL EDUCATION. We do not yet have accurate data on the number of American Indian at-
torneys, much less those from less visible minority groups such as Eskimos.
82. U.S. DFP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, CRARAGTEIusTICS OF THE POPULATION pt.
49, at 41, 489 (1973).
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rently in practice83 Arguably, therefore, a state interest that may once have
been "compelling" has now lost its force. This claim has some superficial ap-
peal, but should not go unchallenged. Even if all the black students now in
law school graduated and became practitioners - an uncertain prospect in
view of recent bar examination studies 4 - the net effect would be to increase
black representation from one to two per cent and not to achieve anything
like national proportionality. Moreover, these dramatic increases in minority
enrollments have come as a direct result of the very preferential policies that
are under review; to use evidence of improvement as a basis for removing the
catalyst would be a perverse form of logic. Meanwhile, there is some evidence
that minority enrollments at the undergraduate levels - the sources of gradu-
ate and professional students - have reached at least a temporary plateau and
may actually be declining.8 5 If such a reversal is indeed under way or in
prospect, it becomes even clearer that continued expansion of minority gradu-
ate enrollments will require preference in graduate admissions. In any case, it
is certainly too early to pronounce an end to the problem of underrepresenta-
tion simply because the numbers of minority students and lawyers are steadily
increasing. The latest data reflect a promising beginning, but only that.
A "compelling" state interest, as has been suggested, should be not only
substantial but demonstrable. There should be a little difficulty in showing the
effects in a particular state or region of the minority underrepresentation in
the legal profession. Courts should be willing to take judicial notice of such
facts as the importance to society of the legal profession and statistics on mi-
nority representation. Evidence might be offered on such issues as the minority
citizen's perception of the legal profession and how that perception is altered
by dealing with a minority attorney; the expectations and aspirations of mi-
nority youths and how expanded access to the legal profession might affect
those aspirations; and perhaps on the particular role of minority attorneys in
cases where language or cultural barriers would reduce the effectiveness of an
"outsider." Such evidence should serve to establish the substantiality of the
governmental interest covered by this first heading, and should go far to vali-
date a program reasonably designed to remedy the current condition.
83. Since there are estimated to be about 3,000 black attorneys currently admitted to
practice, the number of black law students has exceeded that number since the academic
year 1971-1972. The black enrollment for 1973 was 4,817- a figure considerably larger than
the black membership in the bar, even taking recent increases in bar admissions into ac-
count. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1973 SURVEY OF MINORITY GROUPS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION.
84. See, e.g., The Report of the Philadelphia Bar Association Special Committee on
Pennsylvania Bar Admission Procedures, -Racial Discrimination in Administration of the
Pennsylvania Bar Examination, 44 TEmP. L.Q. 141 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania
Bar Examination Report]. For more recent and more alarming data, see ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, BAR EXAMINATION STUDY PROJECT, Memorandum No. 12, pts. 2-4,
which reports on experience of minority students and graduates on the summer 1973 bar
examinations.
85. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1974, §1, at 43, col. 1.
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Preference To Vary and "Humanize" Admission Criteria
It would be quite naive to think that students are admitted to law school
(or to any other highly selective program) solely in rank order on the basis of
test scores and grade point averages. Where the demand for admission is as
intense as it has become in American law and medical schools, strictly nu-
merical selection is impossible; below the top the curve quickly widens to a
point where final choice must be made on the basis of nonquantitative fac-
tors. 6 Nor is departure from strict rank ordering of applicants a novel tech-
nique. Seasoned admissions officers have always made choices partly on sta-
tistical grounds and partly on the basis of myriad other factors that could not
be quantified.8 7 "Preferential admissions" began decades before the current
concern about minority students. Conscious preference has long been given to
children of alumni, legislators, and friends of the institution; students with
unusual forensic or leadership talents; physically handicapped applicants; and
persons from exotic places who could enrich the lives of their fellow students.88
The University of Washington Law School gave preference not only to mi-
nority group members, but also to returning veterans who had earlier been
admitted at a time of less intense competition and now wanted to matriculate.
Ironically, Marco DeFunis himself initially sought one such. preference; his
contention (rejected by both state courts) was that as a Washington state
resident and taxpayer he should be admitted ahead of applicants from other
states with better records.-s Thus, there is nothing either racial or novel about
departures from numerical ranking in the admissions process. The only ques-
tion is the propriety of considering race or ethnic status as a variable factor.
There has been much debate about the accuracy, or possible bias, of the
Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and other standardized examinations9 0
It would not be profitable to reargue here the "fairness" of the LSAT, nor is
it necessary to resolve that issue in deciding the constitutional issue. The ques:-
tion is not whether law schools may continue to. use undergraduate grades and
test scores in the admissions process, but only whether they may. vary .the .role
of these criteria in cases where they feel numerical indicia may not fully
measure human potential. That is a much narrower and easier question than
86. See Brief Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae at 18-19, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
87. See, e.g., Holland, What- Every College President Should Know About Admissions
Practices, in SEr.Wra_ IssuEs IN COLLEGE ADMINISTRATION 17-23 (E. McGrath ed. 1967); Moffit,
The Admissions Process, in PHILOSOPHY AND PROBLEMS OF COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 18-19 (Rich &
Garrett eds. 1963).
88. See B. THPsr.sHE, supra note 32, at 56, 57, 59-61.
89. See 115 of Complaint for. Mandamus, Injunction and Damages, Single Appendix in
the Supreme Court of the United States at 17, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
This issue was briefly disposed of by *the Washington supreme court, and did not reappear.
82 Wash. 2d at 43, 507 P.2d at 1188.
90. E.g., Consalus, The Law School Admission -Test and the Minority Student, 1970 U.
TOL. L. Rv. 501, Goolsby; A Study of the Criteria for Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 175 (1967); Raushenbush, Broadening the Base of Persons Entering the
Legal Profession: Recruitment and Admission to Law Schools, AALS Section on Minority
Groups, Newsletter, May 1974, at 1-3.
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the one that requires detailed validation and content analysis of the tests
themselves. 91
Several factors may establish the compelling character of this second state
interest. There seems no question that the use of standardized tests as per-
formance predictors has brought about the exclusion of disproportionately
large numbers of minority studentsY2 Many of those who have been excluded
would probably have done adequate work, and some might have achieved
distinction. The use of tests undoubtedly also excluded many nonminority
applicants- especially those who have been economically or educationally
disadvantaged- but not in comparable proportions. Yet such an effect does
not mean, ipso facto, that such tests are biased or discriminatory; there is no
evidence that such instruments have been designed or used with any conscious
racial or ethnic animus. Given the close correlation between the tests and the
curriculum in which performance is being predicted, it would be surprising if
the correlation were not quite high. Professor Ernest Gellhorn has observed
that the LSAT "is a mirror image of the law schools. Thus, the cultural bias,
if any, is not inherent in the test, but rather is in the law schools and in their
teaching and testing methods. ' '93 Indeed, one might go on to say that the cul-
tural bias reaches all the way back into the elementary and secondary schools
of which minority students are the products. If the standardized tests ac-
curately predict law school performance, this does not mean either that they
do not exclude substantial numbers of qualified minority applicants, or that
their use in judging minority applications should not be tempered by other
considerations.
The Law School Admission Council has, in fact, consistently warned
against a rigid, inflexible reliance on test scores. Where opponents of prefer-
ential admissions seem to argue that numerical ranking should be strictly ob-
served - at least where race might enter the picture - the sponsors of the
tests disclaim any such infallibility. In its brief amicus curiae in the DeFunis
case, the Law School Admission Council stated publicly its position on this
sensitive question:
[I]t would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and perhaps unlawful for a law
school to look only to the Law School Admission Test in the selection
process, and to refuse to consider other factors which bear upon an ap-
plicant's potential for academic performance in law study, for enriching
the education of his classmates, or for useful service as a lawyer. 4
Such an authoritative statement from the organization responsible for the
tests should leave little doubt about flexible weighing of test scores in the
91. In many recent employment discrimination cases, the fairness or possible bias of
standardized tests and other measures has been analyzed in content terms. See, e.g., Vulcan
Soc'y of New York Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
92. Dyer, Toward More Effective Recruitment and Selection of Negroes for Colleges, 36
J. NEGRO ED. 216, 227 (1967) (comments of the Vice President of the Educational Testing
Service).
93. Gellhorn, supra note 70, at 1069, 1089.
94. Brief for Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae at 12, DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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admissions process. It would be anomalous if a court were to tell a law school
it must give more literal adherence to LSAT results than the Council itself
believes justified. Nor does the preferential admission process involve any
abandonment of test scores and undergraduate grades, even for minority stu-
dents. Most of the students admitted will continue to be white Anglos and, as
in the past, they will undoubtedly be evaluated heavily on the basis of pre-
dicted first-year averages. As the number of minority applicants increases, more
difficult choices must be made within the preferred group, and these decisions
too will be guided by quantitative indicia. But against the background of ex-
clusion, and the current position of the Testing Council, a dispensation for
minority applicants as against the majority group seems at least permissible.95
It is arguable that such an approach to numerical predictors is not only al-
lowable but in fact required. With increasing frequency courts have struck
down public employment testing and screening devices that excluded dis-
proportionate numbers of minority applicants.98 The formula governing such'
cases derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,97
although Griggs dealt strictly with private employment under title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act it established a precedent of far broader scope. The es-
sence of the Griggs decision emerged with stark simplicity: "If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited."9 8 In later employment
cases this formula has been used as a basis for the quota hiring orders briefly
discussed above 99 More precisely, when an employment test or criterion is
shown to be racially exclusionary, the employer must then clearly demonstrate
its job relatedness in order to justify its continued use. In few of the cases
decided in recent months has the employing agency been able to surmount
this rather substantial hurdle. 100
The analogy of public employment cases to preferential admissions is not
a perfect one. The Griggs formula has, however, been applied a bit closer to
the admissions process. In one recent case challenging the procedures for
classification of public school students as "educationally mentally retarded,"
(EMR) the crucial intelligence tests were ruled invalid on Griggs grounds. 01
Following a finding that the use of such tests assigned disproportionate num-
bers of minority children to the opprobrious EMR track, the court required
95. It was this conclusion that apparently persuaded Mr. Justice Douglas that some de-
parture from strict numerical ranking of applicants was permissible: "Insofar as LSAT tests
reflect the dimensions and orientation of the Organization Man they do a disservice to mi-
norities.... My reaction is that the presence of an LSAT test is sufficient warrant for a
school to put racial minorities into a separate class in order better to probe their capacities
and potentials." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 335 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. E.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
97. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
98. Id. at 431.
99. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y of New York City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973), and cases cited note 22 supra.
100. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. See Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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school authorities to demonstrate the educational relevance of the tests, which
they were unable to do. The inability to meet that burden resulted in the
invalidation of standard intelligence measures .1 12
While exclusion from law school is not equivalent to placement in a
remedial class, the partial analogy between the two situations does underscore
the possible relevance of Griggs to the problem of preferential admissions.
Because no law school appears to rely exclusively on test scores or grades, the
case is not likely ever to arise in precisely this form. But when the issue comes
up another way, as it did in DeFunis, a concern for what the law might require
should establish some latitude for voluntary efforts to reduce the barriers and
expand access.
A brief summary will suggest whether the interest in question is com-
pelling. If quantitative admission criteria were shown to be culturally biased
or discriminatory in content, no one would challenge their suspension in mi-
nority admissions. In all likelihood, following the Griggs precedent - and as-
suming that access to higher education is no less important than access to
public employment - such tests would be enjoined on constitutional grounds.
There is no such proof, however, with respect to the LSAT or the predictive
use of undergraduate grades. What has been shown of these criteria is that they
tend to exclude disproportionate numbers of minority applicants - especially
as admission levels continue to rise. Should the issue be pressed, embarrassing
questions might be raised about their "education-relatedness," even without a
finding of cultural bias. Thus, there seems a persuasive case to permit, though
not to require, that a law school consider other factors and weigh the numer-
ical predictors differently in appraising minority applications. A single stand-
ard of review for majority and minority would simply continue the exclusion-
ary pattern of the past.
Preference To Compensate for Past Discrimination and Denial of Opportunity
Quite apart from underrepresentation and exclusion, a third state interest
may independently support preferential admission policies. Though not or-
dered to do so, a law school might well assume a responsibility to remedy past
wrongs by recruiting and admitting more minority students than would enter
through the normal processes. The current underrepresentation of minority
groups in the legal profession did not result solely from lack of interest on the
part of minority students, from a too rigid use of standard admissions criteria,
or even from insufficiency of financial aid. It was only within the last quarter
century that the Supreme Court struck down racial segregation in state-sup-
ported law schools,0 3 and black applicants were excluded from some private
university law schools in the South into the 1960's.104 Segregated bar associa-
tions persisted until remarkably recent times. Even in Northern and Western
states, vestiges of discrimination were evident in bar examinations until very
102. See generally Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical
Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 96-100 (1974).
103. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
104. Gellhorn, supra note 70, at 1070.
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recently.10 5 In short, the legal profession, and the law schools as a major
element of the profession, have contributed to causing the problem they now
seek to alleviate. The brief amicus curiae for some sixty law school deans
argued this point candidly to the Supreme Court:
While not the universal pattern, until recently many law schools
refused to admit blacks, and many blacks who were able to attend law
schools could do so only at all-Negro institution. . . .If a Black did
manage to graduate from law school he faced discrimination from bar
associations, law firms and government agencies.... Thus blacks were
discouraged from going to law school by their prospects after gradua-
tion, were denied admission to law school if they nevertheless applied,
and were less likely to be able to practice law after they graduated.10
The law schools, to be sure,.were not the only culprits. Inequality of edu-
cational opportunity at all levels has denied professional opportunities to mi-
nority groups. As late as 1970, while 16.6 per cent of all whites had graduated
from college, only 6.1 per cent of blacks, 5.3 per cent of persons of Spanish
heritage, and 1.1 per cent of American Indians held baccalaureate degrees.o7
Thus, even equal access to law school would mean far less than proportional
opportunity for these groups to enter the profession. Moreover, the problem
does not stop at the college level. While the attendance and graduation rates
are far higher in the elementary and secondary schools, qualitative differences
become vitally important. Much has been written about the effects on higher
education and career opportunities of overcrowded, undersupported ghetto
and barrio schools.' 08 Here it should suffice simply to note that all levels of the
educational system share some responsibility for the constriction of minority
access to schools.
Although the blame does not rest solely or even primarily with the law
schools, and law schools cannot right all the ills of the educational system, it is
equally clear that there will not be more minority lawyers unless the law
schools assume a leading role in recruitment, admissions, and retention. Under-
graduate minority student programs depend for their effectiveness upon en-
hancement of opportunity for their graduates, which the graduate and pro-
fessional schools can provide. 0 9 Thus, a state (or its law school) might well
assume a major responsibility in this area, even if it had never actually denied
access to minority applicants in the past.
Regardless of past wrongs, a law school might also see a minority recruit-
ment program as a key ingredient of its affirmative action program. Because
such a program -legally required of all institutions of higher learning re-
105. See Pennsylvania Bar Examination Report, supra note 84.
106. Brief for a Group of Law School beans as Amid Curiae at 17, DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
107. Id. at 17 n.15.
108. See, e.g., Cohen, Policy for the Public Schools: Compensation and Integration, 38
HARv. ED. R V. 114 (1968). See also T. CARTER, MEXICAN-AmERICANS IN SCHOOL: A HISTORY OF
EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT (1970).
109. See SCHOLARSHIP FOR SOCIETY: A REPORT ON THE EMERGING ROLES AND REsPONSIBIL-
rriEs OF GRADUATE EDUCATION IN AMERICA 35-37 (1973).
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ceiving federal funds - seeks to overcome past denial of opportunity to mi-
nority groups through higher education, many of the same considerations are
pertinent. Although no institution has yet been required to recruit prefer-
entially as part of its affirmative action obligation, federal officials do view
with suspicion low minority admission and retention rates." 0 Allocation of
financial aid to minority students is also a recurrent concern of HEW visiting
teams. Perhaps most relevant as a component of affirmative action is the re-
cruitment of minority faculty members. Now that every law school must adopt
goals and timetables for the utilization of women and minorities in profes-
sional roles, and must then take positive steps to meet those goals, the legal
education community has a vital stake in the availability of prospective mi-
nority law teachers. Because the employer of faculty talent is also the producer
of that talent, the major law schools cannot avoid faculty recruitment obliga-
tions by pleading unavailability of enough qualified minority law graduates.
The legal education system as a whole, now has a nondelegable responsibility
to increase the pool of minority law graduates from which future law teachers
- always a small and carefully selected fraction of the profession - will be
chosen.
Again, it is important to recall the precise question before us. The issue is
not whether a law school must preferentially admit minority applicants, but
only whether it may do so as part of its general admissions program. The
interest of the legal education community in overcoming the effects of past
discrimination seems a substantial one, especially because the law schools are
not blameless for the current plight of the minority bar. With the added
impetus of the new governmental affirmative action programs, the substantial-
ity of this interest seems beyond question.
Preference and Education: The Law School as Microcosm
Suppose the law school simply decides that an almost totally White-Anglo
student body is educationally unsound and launches a preferential program
for that reason alone. Can this consideration by itself constitute a "compelling
state interest"? It is well to recall at this point precisely what the Supreme
Court said in Sweatt v. Painter,"' which held that Texas could not constitu-
tionally exclude black applicants from law school:
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well
aware that it is an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving
ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation
from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few
students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and exchange of
110. There is a particular irony that the first major court challenge to preferential ad-
missions involved the University of Washington. That institution has been a major target of
federal affirmative action and there has been a serious threat of termination of federal funds
because of allegedly inadequate efforts in this area. See CHRONICLE OF HIGHa EDUCATION,
July 8, 1974, at 3.
111. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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views with which the law is concerned .... with such a substantial and
significant segment of society excluded .... we cannot conclude that the
education offered.., is substantially equal.... 112
The Court's immediate concern was with the black student relegated to a small
and obviously inferior black law school. Precisely analogous reasoning could be
applied to the white student for whom a completely white environment would
be equally unrepresentative of life beyond the ivy walls. Throughout the
Supreme Court's desegregation decisions runs a concern for both black and
white children, and for the values of assimilation and contact through the
school setting. In the Charlotte desegregation case, for example, the Court
recognized that as a matter of "educational policy" a school board "might well
conclude... that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole."113 Thus, there does appear to be
legal support for a preferential admission decision based principally upon the
educational interests of the majority, rather than the minority. If one accepts
as an educational premise that a graduate or professional school should mirror
the society of which it is a part, then the use of preferential admissions to
achieve the requisite mix acquires an additional base of support.
The "microcosm" theory also helps to dispel the argument advanced in
DeFunis that the University of Washington could not justify a preferential
program because under the regular admissions policy the black enrollment in
its law school matched that of the two per cent state population ratio."14 De-
spite its superficial appeal, this argument has several flaws. For one thing, as
noted earlier, blacks were not represented in the Washington bar at anything
like two per cent, but at something like one-third of one per cent." 5 The two
per cent representation that existed several years ago was apparently something
of a fluke, for, without some preferential consideration the class entering in
the fall of 1971 would have contained no black students at all. But these two
points really miss the major issue: The University of Washington and its law
school are at least regional and possibly national institutions, serving a con-
stituency far larger than that of the state. Since the University is now the
second largest recipient of federal funds among all colleges and universities in
the country - ranking close behind MIT16 - it would be supreme irony to
confine its admissions focus to the Pacific Northwest. Moreover, if universities
and law schools could recruit only to the level of local proportionality,
national redress for what is clearly a national problem would be virtually fore-
closed. Ironically, those law schools like the University of Washington, located
in areas of relatively low minority population, would not be able to prefer-
entially increase their minority enrollments, despite the commitment and the
resources to do so; meanwhile, schools in areas of high minority concentration
112. Id. at 634.
113. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
114. Brief for Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Jurisdictional Statement at 14, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). -
115. See text following note 82 supra.
116. CHRONICLE OF HxGHE EDUCATION, July 8, 1974, at 3.
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would be left to bear an even larger share of the already heavy burden of
urban higher education. To hold that local population marks the limits of a
preferential admission policy would, in effect, legitimize the very ethnic quotas
that responsible academic institutions have tried to avoid by eschewing strict
proportionality.
Preferential admission policies might, then, rest at least in part on sound
educational considerations. A college or university - particularly one remote
from urban areas - might well decide that its white students could get a mean-
ingful total education only if they had among their classmates more than a
token number of minority students. Such an educational commitment might
well lead to a minority recruitment and admission program that would only
incidentally benefit the minority students who participated. The primary
beneficiaries would be the institution and its dominant culture. To make such
a choice on educational grounds does seem to reflect a compelling state interest.
The Absence of A lternatives
Earlier we left open the possibility that some or all of the allegedly com-
pelling state interests could be achieved by nonracial means and would thus
fail the final constitutional test. The time has now come to consider several
alternatives - first, to see whether they would serve the same interest; and
second, to see if they are truly nonracial. For the state's interest in educational
diversity, nonracial alternatives would not work. If the goal is to create on
campus a microcosm of society, including substantial minority participation,
only explicit recruitment of minority students will be effective. If the institu-
tion is highly selective, as are almost all law schools, and private liberal arts
colleges like Antioch, Oberlin, and Connecticut Wesleyan that have shown
special concern for minority students, then the preferential consideration of
race seems essential.
The possibility of nonracial responses to the other three interests remains
for consideration. The quest, for such alternatives may be enhanced somewhat
by Mr. Justice Douglas' emphasis in DeFunis on "consideration of [law school]
applications in a racially neutral way." 117 This opinion goes on to suggest
that an admissions committee might in fact increase its share of minority
students by taking into account nonethnic factors that would tend to benefit
minority applicants - interviews, performance in special summer pre-law pro-
grams, prior achievement in light of racial discrimination, commitment to
community service, and perhaps other "racially neutral" criteria. 118 While such
a program might be administratively less convenient than the racial preference,
it would, in Justice Douglas' view, "substantially fulfill the law school's inter-
est in giving a more diverse group access to the legal profession."',19 Several
of the amicus curiae briefs supporting DeFunis in the Supreme Court similarly
117. 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 341.
119. Id.
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argued that however commendable the University's goals might be, they could,
and should be achieved through means that took no account of race.120
The central premise of these alternatives is that programs open generally-
to "disadvantaged" persons will incidentally include more minority students
than would formerly have been admitted. Undoubtedly some increase in
racial and ethnic minority involvement would result, but uncertainly, im-
precisely, and haphazardly. The total number of "disadvantaged" students re-
quired to boost the minority share might well tax the institution's resources
beyond capacity, thus necessitating a substantial cutback in minority enroll-
ment. A college or university cannot - and constitutionally, need not - tackle
all social problems at once, but may decide to begin with those that are most
pressing. The particular choice would be constitutionally vulnerable only if a
compelling state interest were lacking or nonracial ine.ans would equally well,
serve that end. -
There is another reason why nonracia I-lternatives may not work par-
ticularly well. The level of minority interest -in .higher education, and the
number of individual applications, have risen sharply in the last few years. A
major catalyst has undoubtedly been the widespread publicity given to pro-
grams of admissions and financial aid expressly geared to minority students or,
even more specifically, to members of particular ethnic groups. If such pro-
grams were suddenly superseded by more vague appeals, much of the mo-
mentum that has been finally achieved would be lost. Hence the number of
minority students actually recruited through "racially neutral" programs might
well be even fewer than present projections would suggest.
To the extent that such alternatives might function effectively, they would
probably succeed by changing only the form and retaining the substance of
minority programs. For example, a pre-law institute at a black law school,
publicized at black colleges and among black undergraduate groups, would
probably turn out to have a highly homogeneous student body even if the
language of. "disadvantage" were scrupulously employed. A similar program,
announced on Spanish language posters throughout East Los Angeles, would
probably also be quite selective even if not a word were said about the ethnic
background of the applicants. But such avoidance of a "minority" focus would
be disingenuous. In substance such programs would be as clearly and as sharply
aimed at racial and ethnic groups as are the present pre-professional and other
educational efforts. It would be far better to avoid the euphemisms and state
candidly what is being sought - not only to avoid the charge of hypocrisy from
persons for whom the program is dearly not intended, but also to make the
most efficient use of limited resources.
A dilemma thus emerges: alternatives that are truly nonracial are likely to
be far less effective, those that really do offer viable and workable alternatives
are not likely to be truly neutral. If, as Justice Douglas has suggested,' 2' a law
120. See Brief for Advocate Society, American Jewish Committee, Joint Civil Committee
of Italian Americans & UNICO National as Amid Curiae at 25-30, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974).
121. The Washington supreme court dealt directly and forcefully with the "nonracial
alternatives" argument: "If the .aw school is forbidden from taking affirmative action, this
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school admissions committee should rely on nonracial criteria such as com-
mitment to the community, ability to overcome effects of discrimination, or
performance at special pre-law summer institutes, the end result in terms of the
number of minority students might well approximate the effects of the present,
more explicit, selection process. But one wonders whether anything would be
gained by telling a rejected White-Anglo applicant that preference had been
given to persons who looked better on various nonqantitative measures and
just happened to be mostly black or Chicano. In short, the selection process
might appear racially neutral, but if the institution were truly committed to
the goals outlined here, the results would likely be rather race-selective.
This is not to say that "racially neutral" alternatives could not be de-
signed in the future. For the present, such alternatives do not appear to exist.
Perhaps the current critical need to expand minority enrollments simply re-
quires a degree of directness - a focus upon race per se - that will not be
necessary ten years hence. It is quite clear that preferential policies of any
sort should not outlast the justification for them, but should be deemed es-
sentially "emergency" measures. During this transitional period, the use of
nonracial alternatives would only impede the already uncertain and difficult
progress toward vital national goals.
underrepresentation may be perpetuated indefinitely. No less restrictive means would serve
the governmental interest here; we believe the minority admissions policy of the law school
to be the only feasible 'plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now.'" DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d. 11, 36, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973).
[Vol. XXVII
